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comprehensive model of growth, testing its robustness across regions of the world. 
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This paper was written for presentation as the twelfth lecture in the Eric John Hanson 
Memorial Lecture Series at the Department of Economics, University of Alberta, 
Edmonton, 21 March 2006. 
Introduction 
 
It is a great honour to have been invited to give the twelfth Eric John Hanson 
Memorial Lecture. Amongst his many achievements, Hanson remains well known for 
the contributions he made to the study of public finance in the health and education 
sectors. For me, as an education economist, the books he published in the 1970s on 
the financing of education in Alberta, and in western Canada more generally, have 
provided a particularly interesting and instructive read. They are scholarly, written 
with a painstaking attention to detail and with a clear understanding of the interplay 
between economic forces and the force of history. Yet Hanson’s interests were quite 
eclectic, and he is perhaps best known in these parts for his financial history of 
Alberta, a volume that provides a wealth of insight into the operation of the 
macroeconomy in an important and distinctive region of a federal country. Professor 
Hanson’s work in these areas is kept alive at Alberta by a younger generation of 
economists; it is testament both to his influence and to a sense of continuity that so 
many of the current department – including Professors Boothe, Dahlby, Landon, 
McMillan, and Smith – share some of the interests of their illustrious predecessor, and 
continue to produce work of international excellence. 
 
In this lecture, I want to home in on two of Professor Hanson’s interests – the 
economics of education and the performance of the macroeconomy. In doing so, my 
lecture will address issues that have previously been addressed separately in previous 
Hanson lectures given by Josef Ritzen and Judith Maxwell, but I will bring these 
themes together. To be more specific, I intend to examine the contribution that 
education, alongside other factors, makes to long term economic growth.  
 
I make no claim that this is a new topic. In a quote that now seems both jingoistic and 
sexist, but which is nonetheless appropriate for a lecture by a British man visiting 
Canada, Adam Smith (1776), the father of economics, wrote the following: 
 
‘In what way, therefore, has the policy of Europe contributed either to the first 
establishment, or to the present grandeur of the colonies of America? In one way, 
and in one way only, it has contributed a good deal. Magna virum mater (mighty 
mother of men)! It bred and formed the men who were capable of achieving such 
great actions, and of laying the foundation of so great an empire; and there is no 
other quarter of the world; of which the policy is capable of forming, or has ever 
actually, and in fact, formed such men. The colonies owe to the policy of Europe 
the education and great views of their active and enterprizing founders.’ (Wealth 
of Nations, ch. 7) 
 
Smith elsewhere noted the contribution that education makes to individuals’ 
productivity:  
 
‘When any expensive machine is erected, the extraordinary work to be performed 
by it before it is worn out, it must be expected, will replace the capital laid out 
upon it, with at least the ordinary profits. A man educated at the expense of much 
labour and time to any of those employments which require extraordinary 
dexterity and skill, may be compared to one of those expensive machines. The 
work which he learns to perform, it must be expected, over and above the usual 
wages of common labour, will replace to him the whole expense of his education, 
with at least the ordinary profits of an equally valuable capital. It must do this too 
in a reasonable time, regard being had to the very uncertain duration of human 
life, in the same manner as to the more certain duration of the machine.’ (Wealth 
of Nations ch. 10) 
 
It is hard to think of a clearer exposition of the concept that economists now refer to 
as ‘human capital’ – the stock of skills that people are endowed with or acquire 
through investment in training and education and which renders them more 
productive in their work. 
 
Unfortunately, Adam Smith’s early insights on human capital were largely 
overlooked. He is remembered more often as the developer of the theory of the 
‘invisible hand’ which guides a free market economy toward a socially optimal 
solution – in effect he contributed more than anyone to the fall of the Berlin Wall 200 
years after his death, and that is no mean feat.  
 
But the notion of human capital really only started to interest economists more 
recently – once the age of the jet airliner had arrived and people started to make 
comparisons about living standards in different parts of the world. In 1960, a 
development economist called Theodore Schultz gave an address to the American 
Economic Association (Schultz, 1961). He had been researching the determinants of 
farmers’ incomes in developing countries. He found that education was an important 
factor. In his lecture, he coined the term ‘human capital’. In 1979, Schultz was 
awarded the Nobel prize. As things turned out, that award was to herald a renewal of 
interest in his contribution. 
 
Around the start of the 1980s, economists’ understanding of the macroeconomy was 
in a state of flux. The post-war Keynesian consensus had led many economists to 
focus on the short and medium term. The management of the business cycle using a 
full range of fiscal and monetary policies was the order of the day. The election of 
new governments – first in the UK led by Thatcher, and second in the US led by 
Reagan – with explicitly monetarist credentials shifted the focus of attention 
somewhat. Economists became more interested in the way in which policy tools can 
affect long run outcomes, such as economic growth. And one thing that quickly 
became clear was that our traditional models of economic growth were broken. They 
simply failed to predict the most basic of stylized facts about international differences 
in growth patterns or income levels. 
 
Economists responded to this failure of the consensus model in a variety of ways. But 
each solution to the conundrum has, in some way, drawn on the work of Schultz – 
each has given education a core role to play in the determination of growth. 
 
Since Schultz, the notion that differences in education can go some way toward 
explaining differences in economic performance – both of individuals and of whole 
economies – has therefore become increasingly influential. International agencies 
such as the World Bank now invest heavily in education, particularly in developing 
economies, and the perception is widespread that for countries, just as for individuals, 
education provides a route out of poverty. And here is a key to understanding just how 
important the topic of my lecture really is – if, in Alberta, we want our children to do 
well for themselves, how do we do it? If, in Canada, we want to prosper, how do we 
do it? If we want better to address some of the most acute problems of the world – 
famine in Niger, natural disasters in Indonesia or New Orleans – how do we do it? 
 
This has been a long introduction. But I needed to set the scene in some detail. At last 
I have come to a stage where I feel I can tell you where I am going, and I can say 
something about what the shape of the rest of the lecture will be. I will first comment 
in some more detail on the state of play as regards economists’ understanding of the 
forces that determine economic growth. I will then focus on the role that education 
has to play in that growth, but I will recognise that there are gaps in our 
understanding, and so I shall point to some areas where more work is needed to plug 
these gaps. Likewise, I will recognise that education is far from being the only 
important determinant of growth, and I shall say something about the other factors 




New Models of Economic Growth 
 
Let me begin then by saying something about the models that economists nowadays 
use to explain growth. Here I need to tread carefully, for I could well end up sounding 
like the British Treasury Minister, Gordon Brown, who famously befuddled 
journalists and the public alike when he pronounced that economic policy should be 
grounded in ‘post-neoclassical endogenous growth theory’. Despite the jargon, the 
basics are really quite simple: there are two competing views about how economic 
growth is generated.  
 
The first view is that it is easier to catch up than it is to lead. This idea resonates with 
many economists because it draws on a lot of concepts that have been drilled into us 
since we first learned the subject. The so-called law of diminishing returns suggests 
that you get more utility out of something when you only consume a little than when 
you consume a lot; for a firm, extra output is cheaper to produce when you have 
plenty of spare capacity than when you don’t. This concept of diminishing returns is a 
very powerful one: it explains, for example, why McDonalds don’t produce furniture, 
and why Canada and the United States are separate countries. It lies at the heart of 
what we know of as ‘neoclassical’ economics – the economics that has its origins in 
the work of Jevons and Marshall. In the context of growth, the neoclassical model 
implies that the growth rate of the gross domestic product in each country will 
converge on a rate that is determined by the growth of technical progress.1 Since 
technical progress develops at different rates in different countries, we would expect 
the economies of different countries to grow at different speeds. But since poorer 
countries are typically copying technologies developed elsewhere, while richer 
countries must themselves push the frontiers of technology, it would not be surprising 
if we found that poorer countries grow faster than richer ones. Think of China. 
 
Simple variants of this neoclassical model can be constructed where production is 
determined simply by the employment of labour and capital. These simple 
representations have, as I noted earlier, generally performed badly in that, when 
applied in an international context, they make predictions that are severely at odds 
                                                 
1 The first exposition of this model is due to Solow (1956). 
with the facts. In particular, they failed to account for the large gap that exists 
between rich and poor countries in the average per capita incomes of people. For 
example, while the average person in Canada is about 25 times better off than the 
average person in China, the neoclassical model predicts that the gap will be only 
about 2½ times. By any standard that is a spectacular failure.  
 
However, Mankiw et al. (1992) have shown that this failure may not be due to the 
model per se, but rather to the way in which it has been implemented empirically. The 
models that fail assume that there are just two factors of production – the amount of 
capital that is employed and the amount of labour. There is nothing in these models 
about the quality of labour. Once this is taken into consideration, by including 
education as a key variable in the production function, the failings of the model go 
away. The augmented neoclassical growth model – augmented, that is, by the 
inclusion of education as a key factor of production – is the first of the major new 
growth theories to have been developed over the last 20 years.  
 
Now since technical progress in this view is beamed in on the model from outside, 
this type of model is often called an exogenous growth model. This is really quite a 
misleading title, since it is technical progress, rather than growth, that is actually 
exogenous to the model.  But the nomenclature does serve to highlight a serious 
limitation of the neoclassical growth model – namely that it doesn’t really explain 
anything at all about growth. It merely passes the buck, and says that economies will 
grow at a rate determined by technical progress. The obvious question to ask then is: 
what determines the rate of technical progress? 
 
And that is where the second major new theory of growth comes in. This view is that 
growth and the state of technology are mutually dependent. Countries that grow 
quickly invest in research and development, and as a consequence their growth is 
magnified. According to this view, some countries can get into a virtuous spiral of 
growth and development, while others can get stuck into a viscious circle of 
stagnation. Think of sub-Saharan Africa. Some people have termed this the 
‘cumulative causation’ model of growth, a terminology introduced long ago by 
Kaldor (1966). Others, noting the fact that technology is now determined within the 
model itself, have dubbed it the endogenous growth theory.2 The role played by 
research and development in this theory is critical – and investment in research and 
development necessarily implies an investment in education and human capital.  
 
Proponents of the two main contemporary views on economic growth therefore agree 
that education is a critical determinant of growth, but they do not agree on why. 
Advocates of the neoclassical model suggest that labour of higher quality is likely to 
be a more productive factor of production. Endogenous growth theorists meanwhile 
argue that it is the creation of new knowledge that is important.  
 
So much for the theory. What about the facts? We can test the new theories of growth 
against the old theories quite simply by evaluating whether or not education and 
human capital add anything to our ability to explain the international experience of 
economic growth. Several studies, of which the most influential has been that of 
                                                 
2 In addition to Kaldor (1966), an early example of this literature is Nelson and Phelps (1966). The 
endogenous growth models gained in popularity following the publication of Romer (1986) and Lucas 
(1988). 
Levine and Renelt (1992) have confirmed that, along with the rate of investment in 
new capital, education does indeed matter – and matters a great deal.3
 
To demonstrate this, consider the graph shown in Figure 1.4 The horizontal axis 
indicates the value of wealth per person in an economy that is attributable to human 
capital – this is a measure of schooling, spread appropriately over the whole age range 
of those in work.  The vertical axis represents economic growth over the period 1980-
2000. Each data point in the scatter diagram represents one of 85 countries for which I 
was able to obtain complete information. The diagram shows fairly unambiguously 
that there is a positive relationship between human capital and growth. (The one clear 
outlier, with growth of almost 400%, is China. Ignoring this, the scatterplot suggests 
that an increase of $100000 in wealth due to human capital is associated with an 
increase of about 25% in the 20-year growth rate – in annual terms that amounts to a 
little over 1.1 percentage points.) The data in this graph, however, suggest that there 
may be (at least) two groups of countries in the sample – for one group, the 
relationship between growth and human capital is quite flat, while for the other group 
it is relatively steep. Countries in the former group include most of Western Europe, 
North America and Oceania. Countries in the latter group include primarily the south 
east Asian tigers, but also some outliers such as Mauritius and Botswana. Explaining 
the outliers is something that I shall try to do later in the talk. 
 
But what is clear from the graph is that education matters. So the new theories beat 
out the old. Remember, though, that there are two new growth theories. Attempts to 
sort out the debate between proponents of these two theories have, unsurprisingly, 
been frustrated by the fact that education is central to both views of the world. It is 
essential when we want to test one theory against another to have some sort of 
distinguishing feature. There is a distinguishing feature here, but it isn’t education. It 
is to do with convergence. Recall that the neoclassical model predicts that lagging 
economies will find it relatively easy to play catch-up, while the endogenous growth 
model suggests that such economies are in a viscious circle of stagnation. So the 
debate has focused on the question of whether or not economies are converging. 
 
It would be nice to suppose that some clear-cut evidence on this would be obtainable 
from Figure 2. This shows the relationship between the level of the gross domestic 
product in the initial period, and subsequent growth. If convergence is happening – if, 
that is, the neoclassical story is right – then we would expect to see a pattern emerging 
where growth is negatively related to initial gross domestic product. This would 
indicate that initially poorer countries grow quickest because they are catching up. If, 
on the other hand, the processes of endogenous growth dominate, then the richer 
countries will continue to benefit from high growth, while the poorer countries 
continue to stagnate.  A quick look at Figure 2 shows that no clear and simple 
conclusions are possible. Certainly if China is treated as an exception, there does not 
seem to be much of a pattern in the data at all.  
 
                                                 
3 The relationship between growth and investment in physical capital is shown in Appendix 1. 
4 Unless noted otherwise, all data used in this paper come from the World Development Indicators 
series of the World Bank. The growth rates are expressed in per capita terms throughout this paper. 
The education variable used in Figure 1 is the per capita value of wealth held in the form of human 
capital, data for which are obtained from Kunte et al. (1998). 
A more detailed analysis provides more detailed information, however. There are at 
least two clearly identifiable clusters in the diagram. First, there are those countries 
whose gross domestic products grew by about 50 per cent or more in the last 20 years 
of the last century. Some of these have exceptionally high growth, having started out 
with low levels of income. These countries include China, Malaysia, India, Korea, 
and the small economies of Mauritius and Botswana. The Republic of Ireland is also 
in there, having developed very rapidly and been dubbed a ‘celtic tiger’ since its 
admission to the European Union. Other countries have somewhat lower growth rates, 
having started out with relatively high levels of income. These include the United 
States, Japan, and several northern European countries.   If we view all of these 
countries as a single group, it would appear that there is some convergence going on. 
 
On the other hand, we could examine a second group comprising countries where 
growth has been 25 per cent or less over the 20 year period. At the bottom end of the 
scale, these include much of sub-Saharan Africa and much of Latin America. There is 
some evidence of convergence within each of the geographical regions in this group – 
for example, El Salvador played catch-up with Venezuela and  Ghana played catch-up 
with Zambia. But it is clearly not the case that these countries taken as a whole are 
converging on the economies of the far east and the north Atlantic. Relative to these 
more prosperous economies, the low growth economies appear to be in a state of 
chronic stagnation.5
 
The conclusion one can draw from this is that there are clusters of countries.6 Within 
clusters, neoclassical growth mechanisms ensure that catch-up takes place, sometimes 
quickly, sometimes slowly. But between clusters, the process seems to be one of 
cumulative causation, with groups of poor countries continuing to stagnate in relation 
to groups of rich countries. This is quite a complex picture, but it is one that makes 
room for both the neoclassical catch-up model and the endogenous growth model of 
virtuous and viscious circles or  spirals. 
 
 
Refining our Understanding of Education and Growth 
 
Within each model, it is clear that education affects growth (though we don’t yet fully 
understand how or why). Equally, it is clear that quite a lot of the variation in 
countries’ experience of growth remains unexplained by education – the scatter 
diagrams are indicative of a pattern, but they really aren’t that good. Indeed, unless 
we appeal to further variables capable of contributing to our understanding of growth, 
we can still only explain about 35 per cent of the variation in growth rates across 
countries.  So in the remainder of my lecture, I will first investigate whether we can 
learn more about why education matters, and then I shall investigate some other 
variables that could also affect growth. 
 
In considering education so far, all my attention has been on the quantity of education 
provided. This is unsatisfactory for at least two reasons. First, it pays no heed to 
differences in the quality of education. And secondly, it pays no heed to differences in 
the distribution of education experience across individuals within a country. 
                                                 
5 Sachs and Warner (1995) argue that the two groups identified here can be distinguished by the degree 
to which their economies are open to international trade. This is an issue to which we return later. 
6 See Baumol (1986). 
 
Ric Hanushek and Dennis Kimko (2000) have used the results of international tests of 
student learning7 to evaluate the impact of workforce quality on national output and 
growth. These international tests are familiar to any avid newspaper reader; they 
generate headlines – just look back at the Toronto Star for December 7, 2004: 
“International Math Test Scores Canada Third”.8 The tests cover only a relatively 
small set of countries, but by using some rather clever statistical imputation methods, 
Hanushek and Kimko have been able to expand the dataset to include some 90 
countries. Lurking behind the estimates of schooling quality are a host of resource 
variables, such as the pupil-teacher ratio, recurrent expenditure, enrolment rates, and 
regional information.  
 
To see the impact that schooling quality has on growth, take a look at Figure 3.9 This 
maps schooling quality, measured by average test scores on six underlying subject 
tests, onto the 1980-2000 growth rate. The scatterplot here shows a clear positive 
relationship – and a much closer fit than we saw in the earlier scatterplot. Very 
noticeable is the fact that China now does not appear to be anywhere near such a 
prominent outlier as it was before. 
 
The effect of all this is that the inclusion of schooling quality in our set of variables 
that might affect economic growth leads to a very dramatic increase in explanatory 
power. Whereas before we could explain only 35 per cent of the variation in growth 
rates across countries, now we can explain over 40 per cent. Clearly the quality of 
education is very important indeed as a determinant of economic growth and 
prosperity. 
 
And the quality differentials between countries are really wide. In Britain, the 
educational quality measure is 63 points; in Canada it is 55; in France, Australia, 
Japan and New Zealand, the scores are, respectively 56, 59, 66 and 67. Contrast that 
with some poorer countries. In Botswana, the score for educational quality is just 32; 
in Kenya, it is 30. In Bolivia, Ghana, Mozambique, the Central African Republic, and 
in Bolivia and El Salvador, the scores are lower still. In the face of these quality 
differentials, it is difficult to see how some of the developing countries can ever catch 
up, however strong the neoclassical mechanisms might be.  
 
There is a clear policy implication here. The World Bank and other international 
institutions have made a commitment to seek universal primary education – that is a 
global 100 per cent completion rate – by the year 2015. Such an investment in the 
quantity of education is welcome, though we are still far from achieving it – the 
                                                 
7 These are administered by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational 
Achievement (IAE) and the International Assessment of Educational Progress (IAEP). Other 
international measures  of student learning, not used by Hanushek and Kimko, are the Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Studies (TIMSS) and the OECD’s Programme for International 
Student Assessment (PISA). The TIMSS data are collected at the University of British Columbia, and, 
in addition to international comparisons, allow interprovincial comparisons; within Canada, it is 
pleasing to note that Alberta vies with Quebec for the top spot. 
8 On the same day, the same story was covered on the front page of the Edmonton Journal with the 
headline “Alberta students rank among world’s best” and – on the other side of the Atlantic – the 
headline in the Times on the following day was “English Teenagers Slide Down World Education 
League”. 
9 Schooling quality data come from Hanushek and Kimko (2000). 
primary school completion rate across the whole of Africa was just 55 per cent in 
2001. However, put aside for a moment the desirability of universal education.  An 
investment in the quality of that education would also be highly desirable, and would 
significantly aid economic growth. Otherwise the investment in quantity may well be 
wasted. It seems to me that an obvious mechanism that could be of huge mutual 
benefit to rich and poor countries alike would involve the developed countries in 
sending able young teachers for periods of work experience in developing countries; 
they could be tasked with teaching children in these countries themselves, but also 
with passing on the benefits of their own training to other local teachers. Such a 
scheme could be financed in part by national governments which see benefits in the 
experience which teachers gain abroad, but also by international agencies keen to 
ensure that the extra quantity of education they provide is matched by quality. 
 
High quality of education is, of course, particularly important in the endogenous 
growth view of the world. If growth is stimulated by research and development, then 
it is likely that it is those individuals at the top end of the educational ladder who will 
be the generators of economic advancement. This reinforces the view that quality is 
important, but it also suggests that the distribution of education might be just as 
significant a determinant of growth as is the average level of educational attainment. 
And, again if this is correct, it may be the case that growth in developing economies 
can more cost-effectively be secured, not by guaranteeing primary education for all, 
but by guaranteeing higher education for some.  This is not a very politically correct 
suggestion, but it is one that should be investigated – doubly so because there are 
reasons why the relationship might work the other way. Governments have apoor 
track record at picking winners. If I may mix my metaphors, the best way to make 
sure the cream rises to the top may be to let a thousand flowers grow. 
 
So what is, then, the relationship between educational inequalities and growth? Until 
the last few years, this was not a question that could be answered. The distribution of 
education is not a straightforward thing to measure. It requires information not only 
about the proportions of the current cohort of young people who leave education after 
completing various levels, but also similar information for every generation still alive. 
For many countries, this extent of detail in data which are quasi historic in nature has 
become available only very recently.10 Nevertheless, several datasets have now been 
constructed that allow the analysis of educational inequalities within each of a large 
number of countries.  
 
An admirably comprehensive study of these data has been conducted by Amparo 
Castelló and Rafael Doménech (2002).11 They find unambiguous evidence that 
education inequalities dampen growth, and that this effect is over and above the effect 
due to the level of investment in schooling per se.  
 
Figure 4 shows the mapping between educational inequalities and growth.12 It is very 
clear from this diagram that countries where educational provision is relatively 
unequal across individuals tend to perform relatively poorly in terms of economic 
growth.  
 
                                                 
10 The first attempt was by Thomas et al. (2000). 
11 Earlier studies include Birdsall and Londoño (1997). 
12 The education inequality data come from using data for 1999 from Castelló and Doménech (2002). 
This finding, based as it is on a macroeconomic analysis, should not be surprising to 
those who study the economics of education from a microeconomic perspective. The 
social rate of return on investments in primary education in developing countries 
substantially exceeds those obtainable on investments in more advanced levels of 
education. In sub-Saharan Africa, taken as a whole, for example, the social rate of 
return on primary education is 25 per cent, while the corresponding figure for higher 
education is just 11 per cent (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). So we should not 
be surprised to find that the best place to put the marginal dollar of spending is in 
widening access to primary education. There is, therefore, no case for educational 
resources in poor countries to be focused on an élite. This is, after all, the 
underpinning of the initiative to provide universal primary education by the year 
2015.    
 
All of this tells us that the quality and distribution of education offer us some extra 
insight into the relationship between education and growth. With the variables that I 
have considered already we can now explain about 42 per cent of the variation in 
international growth rates by appeal to education variables, investment, and initial 
income alone. That means there is still a lot of explaining to do. I shall therefore, in 




Further Determinants of Growth 
 
The first new candidate determinant of growth is something that I shall refer to as the 
openness of the economy – does the economy open itself up to free trade, or does it 
impose restrictive trade barriers in the forms of tariffs and quotas. This is, of course, 
quite a controversial issue. The movement toward free trade and increased 
globalisation has drawn critics from many areas. Some environmentalists view free 
trade as a threat because it increases pollution due to transportation of goods across 
the globe – though I would argue that this is a separate issue. Some left wing activists 
resist free trade for ideological reasons, or because they perceive threats to the 
working conditions of the domestic labour force – though constant flexibility 
probably poses less of a threat than retrenchment followed by periodic seismic 
readjustments. Some aid organisations oppose free trade because they consider it 
harmful to the interests of developing countries – though usually what they are 
thinking of is the perpetuation of barriers to free trade that Western governments 
have, in a masterpiece of doublethink, argued are there to protect free trade. (I’m 
thinking here of things like the European Union’s iniquitous Common Agricultural 
Policy.) And doubtless there are militant groups in parts of the world that are not free 
who oppose globalisation because they see it as economic imperialism – the 
McDonaldsisation of the universe. And who can blame them – except for the fact that 
people in those parts of the world surely choose to buy hamburgers (otherwise the 
stores would not be there), and so are presumably made better off by their availability.  
 
On the other side are the proponents of globalisation and of free trade. Their argument 
is a simple one. If you allow consumers and businesses around the world to trade with 
one another in whatever way they choose, all can gain. So, for example, we should 
not impose quotas on the import of textiles from China, because doing so would 
deprive us of cheap clothes and deprive the Chinese of jobs in an industry where they 
have a comparative advantage. By freeing up trade, we give each country the 
flexibility to concentrate on the things that, in relative terms, it does best. And that 
being the case, world output should be higher under free trade than under any 
alternative regime. The recent ‘bra wars’ between the European Union and China – 
still not satisfactorily resolved – illustrate just how hot a political potato this issue can 
be.  
 
A large body of research has investigated the impact of openness on growth. The vast 
bulk of the studies conclude that openness does indeed stimulate economic 
development.13 To see how this works out in practice, consider Figure 5. As usual, 
this shows growth on the vertical axis. The indicator of openness on the horizontal 
axis is a binary measure developed by Sachs and Warner (1995); this equals 1 if the 
country has an open trade regime (as defined by the existence or otherwise of high 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, a high black market premium on international currency, 
government monopoly in major exports, and rule by a socialist government) – 
otherwise it equals zero. To be sure this is a crude measure of openness, but the 
message that the graph provides is clear enough for us to be pretty confident that 
openness, however measured, has an impact. 
 
This is important, of course, in terms of the economic history of the world, and in 
particular in terms of the experience of many countries in the latter part of the 20th 
century after they gained freedom from colonial rule. During that period, a powerful 
counterargument to free trade held sway; this took the form of the infant industry case 
for protectionism. Impressed by the rapid industrialisation achieved by countries in 
the Soviet bloc, many countries – especially in Africa – eschewed the opportunity to 
integrate fully with the global economy. But small countries do not benefit from the 
diversity of resources available to a large country, and countries with strong tribal 
cultures differ from countries with a strong and unified authoritarian tradition. One 
person’s meat is another person’s poison, and the African experiements with 
protectionism failed, at great cost to the general population.  
 
Some time ago, I mentioned a couple of outliers – Mauritius and Botswana – which in 
some respects have behaved more like south east Asian economies than like countries 
in the Indian Ocean or Africa. Both of these countries are distinct from other 
economies in their region because of a high degree of openness (which in turn may 
owe much to their small size – both have populations of well under 2 million). In this 
respect, they are similar rather to the economies that we think of as the Asian tigers. 
And they have reaped rewards for their willingness to engage with the global 
economy: over the last two decades of the last century, the gross domestic product of  
Botswana grew by 135 per cent while that of Mauritius grew by some 145 per cent. 
For each of these two countries, that is the difference between a gross domestic 
product of about $1500 per person per year (measured in 1995 US$) and $4000 per 
person per year.  
 
The second new candidate determinant of growth is closely related to the first. It is the 
economic performance of trading partners. This sounds like an obvious 
explanation, but it is one that is quite difficult to test empirically. Suppose that three 
                                                 
13 These include, for example, Edwards (1993, 1998) and the papers surveyed by Baldwin (2003). A 
dissenting view is given by Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000). 
countries form an exclusive trading partnership – America, Britain and Canada. I shall 
conveniently label these three countries A, B and C.  Now suppose that a spurt of 
growth occurs in A. This might be because the development of a new technology 
increases productivity in that country, thereby making the country richer. A’s citizens 
will have more income and so their consumption will increase – including their 
consumption of imported chemicals from B and wood from C. The extra exports from 
B and C generate growth in those countries too. As a result, these countries start to 
import more electronics from A (and also more things from each other). This spillover 
effect further boosts growth in all three countries - and subsequently a kind of global 
multiplier effect ensues where growth in one country stimulates growth in the others. 
The conceptual mechanism is not therefore difficult to grasp, but the problem with 
testing this statistically is that with so much going on, it is difficult to distinguish 
between the extent to which one country’s growth is affected by the growth of its 
trading partners, and the extent to which it is the first country’s growth that is 
stimulating growth elsewhere. There is an extremely complicated chicken-and-egg 
problem here.14  
 
If I may digress for a moment, I should note that the chicken-and-egg problem affects 
also the determinants of growth that I have mentioned earlier. Certainly it seems as 
though education influences growth; it seems as though investment  influences 
growth; and it seems as though growth in one country depends on growth in its 
trading partners. But equally it might be the case that higher growth economies tend 
to invest more in both physical and human capital, that they tend to be more stable, 
and that their own high growth stimulates the economies of the countries that they 
trade with. In a real sense, of course, this two-way causality is what lies at the heart of 
the endogenous growth theory: a virtuous spiral of growth, investment, growth, 
investment and growth again. But correlation is no proof of causation, and it would be 
misleading to infer that the graphs I have shown are sufficient, on their own, to 
demonstrate that education policies can deliver economic prosperity. To establish 
what causes what requires the use of statistical and econometric techniques that are 
more powerful than simple graphs. Likewise it should be borne in mind that graphs 
can only allow us a two dimensional view of any issue; we have seen that various 
aspects of the education system, investment, and the economic environment each 
individually appears to affect growth, but this is not the same as knowing that all of 
these together combine to determine the growth rate. But, as it happens, the results 
that I have reported are all robust; they survive the most rigorous interrogations that 
can be imposed on them by econometric testing. In other words we can have a high 
degree of confidence that these really are the things that determine economic growth. 
 
But let me get back now to the specific chicken and the specific egg – growth in one 
country and growth in that country’s trading partners. Arora and Vamvakidis (2005) 
have recently studied this issue and have taken pains to correct statistically for the 
chicken and egg issue. Their estimates suggest that the spillover effects of growth 
from one trading partner to another are substantial – indeed that an increase of 1 per 
cent in the growth rate of a country’s trading partners can lead to a rise of 0.8 per cent 
in the country’s own growth rate after the spillover effects have been taken into 
account. That is a huge impact. They also show that geographically proximate 
countries tend, not surprisingly, to trade with each other. This explains in large 
                                                 
14 Which came first - the chicken or the egg? 
measure why the experience of growth across the globe varies much more between 
the most broadly defined regions of the world (continents, say) than it does between 
countries within those regions. 
 
Figure 6 plots growth against a measure of the growth experience of countries’ 
trading partners.15 The positive relationship here is clear and unambiguous. 
 
This result suggests that a policy consideration for developing countries should be to 
encourage production of goods and services that can readily be marketed to high 
growth countries, and to encourage also their effective marketing in those countries. 
 
The third new candidate determinant of growth is political stability. Several 
researchers have investigated the role of the political environment from a number of 
slightly different perspectives – stability, democracy, absence of corruption.16 But, of 
these, it is political stability that seems to be the most promising in explaining growth.  
 
The relationship between political stability and economic growth is illustrated in 
Figure 7.17 Of course, there may be something of a chicken and egg situation 
embedded in this relationship, as in the others that I have discussed. Political regimes 
are likely to come under most pressure when they are unsuccessful, and regimes that 
are in some other respects unpleasant find their subjects to be forgiving so long as 
sufficient economic growth is being delivered. As James Carville so memorably said: 
it’s ‘the economy, stupid’.  Nonetheless there is good reason to suppose that political 
stability is a prerequisite for successful economic development; investors in both 
physical and human capital are more likely to have confidence in an environment 
which is stable than in one which is not.  
 
Research by Yi Feng (1997) is particularly careful to correct statistically for the 
chicken and egg problems. He concludes that ‘democracy tends to have a positive 
effect on economic growth by inhibiting extra-constituitional political change and 
favouring constitutional political change. Democracy provides a stable political 
environment which reduces unconstitutional government change at the macro level; 
yet along with regime stability, democracy offers flexibility and the opportunity for 
substantial political change within the political system.’ Of course, there are non-
democratic countries, of which China is the prime example, that have recently 
demonstrated similar flexibility, though this is perhaps less usual. Perhaps the free 
market in that vast country imposes disciplines on government that come close to 
mimicking those of a free electorate. Whatever, Feng goes on to conclude that ‘the 
juxtaposition of macropolitical certainty and micropolitical adjustability may be 
regarded as the ultimate basis for sustainable economic growth and expansion’. 
 
Following that ringing endoresement for our own political system, I am tempted to 
say only a little about some other determinants of growth that have been identified in 
the literature. The quality and extent of health care maintains human capital in much 
the same way as education augments it; we would therefore expect countries that 
                                                 
15 The measure is derived from Table 2 in Arora and Vamvakidis (2005).  
16 See, for example, Feng (1997), Quinn and Woolley (2001), and Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004).  
17 The political stability data are from Carleton University’s Country Indicators for Foreign Policy, 
available at http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/rank.htm. 
invest heavily in health care to have relatively low morbidity rates, so that people can 
work more, and so that the economy can prosper.18
 
Rates of entrepreneurship vary considerably across countries owing to cultural and 
economic factors. Countries where the incidence of entrepreneurship is high might be 
expected to have high rates of investment and so also of growth.19
 
The next factor is good news for Canada and Britain, but bad news for Alberta – it has 
been argued that landlock influences growth.20 Doubtless this explains the funny 
shapes of some countries on the map – Iraq is one example, but a more extreme case 
is Russia, which has a small annexe sandwiched between Lithuania, Poland, and the 
Baltic Sea. This might explain also the extent to which many countries have 
developed mainly along their seaboard: again, think of China, and think of how nine 
of the world’s ten largest cities are located on the coast.  (The exception is Mexico 
City.) This is all, of course, to do with trade. It is not all doom and gloom for Alberta, 
however. Switzerland is landlocked and rich, and it specialises in watches and finance 
which are both easily transportable. Likewise, pipelines make easy the transportation 
of Alberta’s rich reserves of oil and gas.  
 
Next, let us consider the tendency for some governments to distort markets by way of 
price controls. This leads to a ‘black market premium’ for some goods and services. 
Several studies have found that a higher level of government price distortion leads to 
lower growth.21 Where prices are distorted, incentives are blunted, and this likely 
diverts investment away from the areas that would be most efficient. 
 
The final factor that I shall discuss is institutions. Daron Acemoglu et al. (2001) have 
argued persuasively that the institutions that many African countries inherited from 
colonial times have survived into the present and have equipped them poorly to make 
the transition out of poverty.  
 
I have made much of the roles played by investment, education, openness, trading 
patterns and political stability in the determination of growth. Taking a global view, 
using, as I have done, data from countries all over the world to evaluate the strength 
of the claims made for these variables, it is clear that these things really are important. 
But are they equally important in all places? Or are some of these things more, or less, 
important, in developing countries than elsewhere? 
 
To address this issue, I have estimated a statistical model in which growth depends on 
initial income, the investment to GDP ratio, school enrolment rates, schooling quality, 
schooling distribution, openness, growth amongst trading partners, and a measure of 
political stability.22 The equation allows me to explain almost 50 per cent of the inter-
country variation in growth rates. That is far from perfect, but it is also far better than 
the simple models with which we started out. I have tested to see whether the equation 
is any different for Africa and Latin America compared with the rest of the world. My 
results suggest that there are some very considerable differences of this kind; so much 
                                                 
18 See Fogel (2004). 
19 See van Stel et al. (2005) 
20 See Sachs (2003) 
21 See, for example, Castelló and Doménech (2002).  
22 See Appendix 2. 
so, in fact, that if I allow for these differences I can explain well over 80 per cent of 
the inter-country variation in growth rates. In the countries of Africa and Latin 
America, the amount of wealth due to human capital, the extent of openness to trade, 
and the catch-up effect are all much stronger determinants of growth than elsewhere. 
Meanwhile in these regions, the rate of investment in physical capital is less important 
than in other parts of the world. These findings themselves have important policy 
implications. Amongst other things, for example, they imply that foreign direct 
investment is likely to be a more effective stimulator of growth in, say, China, than in 
sub-Saharan Africa – in the latter region, the pressing needs are for education and 
open trade policies. Here it may be the case that investment in education and openness 
are, in the most literal sense, prerequisites that must be met,  but which as yet have not 






Back to Eric Hanson. In ‘Financing Education in Alberta’ he wrote: ‘ Education 
increases the effectiveness of labour in production by its impact on the individual. It 
also affects the productivity of co-workers who are influenced by the guidance, skills 
and viewpoints transmitted by the educated person… Education generally facilitates 
the spread of innovations and it induces research and technological progress. 
Expenditures on post-secondary education need to be sufficiently high that they 
ensure the preservation and enrichment of the welfare of the society, the promotion of 
democracy in government, and the achievement of productivity and efficiency in the 
economy.’ 
 
Where will our understanding of growth go next? There are some clear policy 
implications that fall out of the analysis that I have surveyed. These include: how to 
achieve universal primary education, a goal that looks like proving elusive despite the 
huge investments being made – I would suggest that effective, incentive-based, 
policies to reduce the incidence of child labour might be a good place to start; how to 
improve the quality of education especially in countries which lag behind the pace in 
economic terms – international transfer of expertise would help; and some of the 
poorest countries need to support both production and marketing in industries where 
the potential exists to trade with the fastest growing nations. The implementation and 
evaluation of policies such as these will be an obvious next step. Understanding how 
groups of countries are formed into convergence clusters, and how policy can change 
the composition of these clusters, will also be key to the enhancement of our 
understanding of the processes underpinning economic development. 
 
To end, let me say something about the situation in Alberta. Here you have arguably 
the highest quality system of education in Canada, comparable with the best in the 
world – certainly that is what the TIMSS data reveal. You have a ratio of investment 
to gross domestic product that, on the latest figures from Statistics Canada, dwarfs 
that in any of the other southern provinces of the country. Your trading partners are 
performing well and you enjoy political stability. Whatever business cycles may bring 
in the short term, in the longer term all these things place you very well for further 
economic growth and prosperity. You have been very kind to invite me here to talk 
with you. I am glad that the message that I am able to bring you is one that says that 
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Appendix 1: The relationship betwen growth and the investment:GDP ratio 
 
The neoclassical model of Solow (1956) suggests that a positive relationship will be 
observed between the investment:GDP ratio and growth. This is illustrated in Figure 
A1. In the context of the findings reported in Appendix 2, it is instructive to note that 
the observations which have investment rates above 30% and which are close to the 
horizontal axis are Lesotho, Nicaragua and Mozambique; as shown in Appendix 2, 
investment in physical capital is a less powerful determinant of growth in Africa and 




Appendix 2: Statistical model 
 
A straightforward multivariate OLS regression of growth against the variables in the 
graphs above provides results that are broadly in accord with the discussion in the 
main part of the paper. All but two variables are statistically significant at 
conventional levels; those that are not are the distribution of education and openness. 
Of the significant variables, all have the expected signs. The regression is based on 
data for 64 countries for which complete data are available. See Table A1. 
 
The null hypothesis that that the equation is the same for (i) African and Latin 
American and (ii) all other countries can be tested by way of an F test. The resulting 
F9,46 statistic is 8.88 which clearly indicates that we should reject the null in favour of 
the alternative. Table A2 shows the re-estimated equation with separate coefficients 
for the two areas of the world that we have identified. Note that the explanatory power 
in this equation, as measured by R squared, rises to 82 per cent. 
 
Some circumspection is needed when analysing equations of this kind. In particular, 
issues of endogeneity bias are of concern. These issues are not tackled here owing to a 
lack of available instruments. Nevertheless, the finding that the equation is not robust 
across broadly defined regions is likely to be instructive. 
 
 
Table A1 Regression explaining % per capita growth rate 1980-2000 
 
variable coefficient t statistic 
   
constant -38.434 -0.56 
investment:GDP ratio 2.806 2.42 
wealth held as human capital 0.388 1.83 
schooling quality 1.578 1.75 
distribution of education 18.604 0.21 
openness -16.405 0.80 
growth rate of trading partners 46.037 2.66 
political instability -10.882 2.80 
initial GDP -0.005 3.23 
   
R squared 0.4944  
 
Table A2 Regression explaining % per capita growth rate 1980-2000, two region 
world 
 




coefficient               t statistic 
variables interacted with binary 
variable (1 = Africa or Latin 
America; 0 = elsewhere) 
 
coefficient               t statistic 
     
constant 35.569 0.32 -52.757 0.43 
investment:GDP 
ratio 
7.685 3.46 -7.024 2.92 
wealth held as 
human capital 
0.230 1.34 1.479 3.50 
schooling 
quality 
0.825 0.79 -0.574 0.41 
distribution of 
education 
22.292 0.22 -4.275 0.03 
openness -178.626 3.60 168.157 3.24 
growth rate of 
trading partners 
15.948 1.05 -25.836 0.82 
political 
instability 
-0.866 0.16 -2.686 0.41 
initial GDP -0.003 2.53 -0.022 2.85 
     
R squared 0.8153    
 
